CCR Resolutions Database

The CCR has been traditionally been concerned with the root causes of mass exoduses;

1. Some countries interpret the Refugee Convention in a narrow and technical manner denying effective protection to refugees;
2. Canadian visa officers sometimes show too much deference to the decisions of tribunals of other countries which have refused refugee claims which under the Canadian interpretation of the Convention would be accepted;
3. Canada's visa offices are inconsistent in their efforts to establish meaningful channels of communication with local and Canadian NGOs involved in resettlement;
4. Canada has failed to put in place meaningful review of negative decisions despite a refusal rate significantly higher than other resettlement countries;
5. Applicants for resettlement from some countries are deported from those countries despite having applications for resettlement to Canada pending, particularly in light of the frequent long processing times for such applications;

1. The Canadian Council for Refugees has promoted the involvement of NGOs in the identification of refugees overseas;
2. Citizenship and Immigration Canada`s refugee resettlement model proposes the involvement of NGOs as overseas service partners;

1. Colombia continues to experience a plague of human rights violations with comparatively little world attention and near total impunity for the perpetrators;
2. The Colombian government continues to disavow responsibility for the human rights violations;
3. On 16 May 1998 Colombian paramilitaries murdered seven people and disappeared 25 others in Barrancabermeja;
4. A campaign has been organized by a coalition of Colombian NGOs to try the perpetrators of this crime in public opinion tribunals in several countries, including Canada;

1. The CCR has passed an earlier resolution that the Right of Landing Fee is discriminatory, exclusionary and racist because of the vast variance in country and individual income around the world, and is particularly burdensome for refugees;
2. Previous to 1995 refugees were not charged interest on transportation loans, admissibility loans and assistance loans;
3. The interest rate charged is above prime rate;

1. General Augusto Pinochet is presently detained in the United Kingdom pending extradition proceeding initiated by Spain, France and Switzerland;
2. General Pinochet's 1973 coup d'état against Chile's democratically elected government and the brutal dictatorship which he directed until 1990 was responsible for the deaths and/or disappearance of more than 3,000 Chileans and others, the torture and imprisonment of many thousands more and the forced exile of still more thousands to many countries including Canada;
3. Applications have been made to the government of Canada by a Canadian citizen who was detained and tortured in Chile in October 1973, as well as by a number of Canadian citizens of Chilean origin who experienced severe abuses throughout the Pinochet years, for the prosecution and extradition of General Pinochet;

Groups applying for Joint Assistance Sponsorships for Women at Risk can face unexpected requests for travel costs in addition to the resettlement support they promised;

1. Human rights violations in Guatemala have increased significantly since the April 1998 assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera two days after he presented the report of the Interdiocesan Project to Recover the Historical Memory (REMHI) which named some of the perpetrators involved in torture, killings, massacres and disappearances;
2. The REMHI report not only documents 55,021 cases of victims, holding the Guatemalan Army and paramilitary squads responsible for 85.4% of the crimes and the insurgency responsible for 9.3% of those crimes, but also exposes the way the repressive apparatus operates allowing powerful perpetrators of human rights violations to continue to act with impunity;
3. Luis Yat, indigenous mayor of El Quiche was assassinated in front of his wife and children last May 6 and numerous members of indigenous, women's and human rights organizations continue to be threatened and intimidated;
4. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) requested the Guatemalan State to provide protective measures for 110 members of REMHI and workers at the Human Rights Office of the Catholic Archdiocese who are at risk;

1. The violation of human rights in Colombia has reached unprecedented and outrageous levels;
2. The targets of this violence are key institutions of civil society (human rights groups; church, justice and peace groups; workers and trade union leaders; peasant and indigenous organizations);
3. The Colombian government has proven, once again, to be unwilling and incapable of curbing the atrocities committed by the military and especially the paramilitary formations;
4. An estimated one million Colombians are internally displaced within the country;
5. Colombia was added to the Source Country list this year;

1. Visa officers appear to be refusing an increasing number of privately sponsored refugee applicants;
2. There is no appeal from such refusals except by way of judicial review which few applicants are aware of or resourced to pursue;
3. Canada Immigration National Headquarters staff have indicated no more exact figure than that between 40% and 60% of privately sponsored refugees are refused;

1. There are 3,000 Assyrian Christians who fled Iraq due to the war and persecution and are living temporarily in Jordan;
2. There are 2,000 Assyrian Christians living temporarily in Turkish refugee camps;
3. There have been many cases of further mistreatment in both Turkey and Jordan;

1. The Sponsorship Agreement notes as Principle #3 the ability of the Sponsorship Agreement Holder (SAH) to submit undertakings for refugees referred by the sponsor and further to this, Appendix 3 describes the roles and responsibility of this undertaking in Joint Assistance Sponsorships;
2. The ability to refer refugees for resettlement to Canada has been of longstanding importance to sponsors and to the CCR and it has been the practice of some sponsors to refer refugees for consideration under the Joint Assistance Program;
3. The new regulations require a sponsor to sign a CR3 undertaking at the front-end of a referral of a refugee for consideration as a CR5, thus negating the need for the visa post to give due consideration to the eligibility for the CR5 programs and obliging the sponsor to fulfil their undertaking for full support as a CR3;
4. Citizenship and Immigration Canada commits in the Sponsorship Agreement (page 6 - j) to make "best efforts to give notice of any change in policy, regulations or legislation that is likely to affect this Sponsorship Agreement": and this notice was not made;
5. There is no mechanism available to sponsors to make referrals under the Joint Assistance Program other than by signing the undertaking as a CR3;
6. NGOs overseas have the ability to refer refugees to the visa post for consideration as CR5s;
7. CIC has indicated that it is difficult to identify enough refugees for resettlement in order to meet its annual targets;
8. Joint Assistance Sponsorship cases may have community links in the destination community who will enhance the potential for successful establishment of otherwise difficult cases;

1. The Focus Humanitarian Program focuses only on Ismaili refugees and other Afghan refugees do not have access to it;
2. Local Canadian language training programs in Pakistan for Afghan refugees are exclusively for members of the Ismaili Community;
3. Other requests for language training preparation for Afghan refugees have been rejected on the basis of the presence of the Focus Humanitarian language training program;
4. The situation of refugees and displaced Afghans particularly women has deteriorated as previously noted in Resolution 12 of November 1996;
5. Most humanitarian aid programs to Afghan refugees have been cut back;

1. Presently no guidelines exist at the IRB with respect to making children's best interests a primary consideration in appropriate cases before it;
2. The need to assign primary consideration to the best interests of children is required by international legal instruments to which Canada is a party;
3. The Federal Court of Canada has failed to give effect to the best interests of children representing more than a consideration in immigration matters affecting children's interests;

1. A humanitarian tragedy is being played out in Zaire and Rwanda and urgent action from the international community is needed.
2. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees have repatriated from Zaire to Rwanda, resulting in the need for a massive settlement program in Rwanda.
3. The Government of Canada has announced its intention to lead an international military force to protect humanitarian relief operations in eastern Zaire.
4. Gross human rights violations and a lack of a functioning judicial system are major impediments to reconciliation in Rwanda.
5. Leaders of the 1994 Rwandan genocide are living freely in Zaire and other neighbouring countries.

1. When the Government of Canada first negotiated with NGOs to join in the resettlement of refugees through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, NGOs agreed to participate on the condition that the three principles of partnership, additionality and naming were guaranteed.
2. These three principles were clearly articulated and supported in the Private Sponsorship Review.
3. The Government of Canada regularly attempts to dilute these principles.

1. The situation for all Burmese refugees in Thailand remains precarious, but for Karen and other ethnic minorities it is particularly tenuous.
2. Exit visas to Canada are only granted by the Royal Thai Government to those refugees who have obtained an offer of a sponsorship, have been approved by the Government of Canada, have UNHCR "person of concern" status and are in the "safe camp" for the required three month period.
3. UNHCR "Person of Concern" status is rarely granted to Karen and other ethnic minority refugees in Thailand, and they are denied access to the "safe camp".
4. Earlier CCR resolutions called on the Royal Thai Government not to require refugees to go to the "safe camp" to await resettlement, but this requirement is still in effect and is causing hardships and delays for refugees with approved sponsorships who are NOT in the "safe camp".

1. The situation in southern Sudan is characterized by civil war, massive refugee flows, internal displacement, massive violations of human rights and chronic famine on an unprecedented scale.
2. A peaceful solution is needed to end the civil war that has continued for 30 years.
3. The international community should give urgent and concerted attention to the humanitarian tragedy of southern Sudan.

1. Some refugees selected overseas are resettled in Canada without their immediate families (usually because they are in another country).
2. Some refugees granted status by the IRB are advised not to include immediate family members on their permanent residence application, in the interests of speedier processing.
3. Both of these groups of people may face financial barriers when they subsequently attempt to be reunited with their family, because they are no longer classified as refugees.
4. There is inconsistency across Canada in the application of financial requirements for the sponsorship of spouses and dependent children.

1. CCR Resolution #10 of May 1995 called on the Government of Canada to accept Afghan refugees and expedite their processing at the relevant visa posts abroad.
2. There are recent reports from Afghanistan about inhumane treatment of women including preventing women from appearing in public, from obtaining education, and from working outside their homes which has especially affected those widows who are the only breadwinners for their families.
3. Amnesty International and other human rights groups have singled out the extreme human rights violations of the regimes and warring factions in Afghanistan especially against women.
4. Afghan women continue to face great risks to their personal safety and security in the highly unsafe refugee camps in neighbouring countries.

1. The conflict in the Sudan is over three decades old.
2. Many Sudanese refugees languish in refugee camps in Kenya, Uganda and elsewhere in Africa.
3. There is no imminent likelihood of these refugees repatriating to the Sudan.
4. The majority of these refugees are youth with no opportunities for education past the secondary level.
5. There is little opportunity for these youth to resettle to a third country.

1. Some refugee women in need of resettlement fit the special criteria of the Women at Risk Programme (in general women in urgent need of resettlement (Stream A) or women who require longer term settlement assistance (Stream B));
2. The CCR has called for the expeditious processing of Stream A cases;
3. The CCR has affirmed the use of the Joint Assistance Initiative (formerly Joint Assistance Programme) for Stream B cases;
4. Citizenship and Immigration officials have indicated that refugee women fitting the Stream A of the Women at Risk Programme have been processed as government-assisted refugees (CR1) because CR1 refugees can be processed more quickly than Women at Risk cases;
5. When Stream A Women at Risk cases are processed as CR1s they are not counted in Women at Risk Programme statistics;
6. Citizenship and Immigration Canada has not followed up on its review of the Women at Risk Programme nor responded to the recommendations adopted by the CCR in November 1994;

1. Consultations on resettlement policy and practices have been launched by the UNHCR;
2. EXCOM Conclusion 19(p) of October 1995 states "The Executive Committee reiterates the continued importance of resettlement as an instrument of protection and its use as a durable solution to refugee problems in specific circumstances; welcomes the initiative in commissioning an evaluation study and the UNHCR consultation on resettlement; and encourages UNHCR to continue the process of dialogue with interested Governments and non-governmental organizations to strengthen its activities in this connection, and to provide regular reports to the Executive Committee";

1. There have been many refugees found ineligible for government or private sponsorship because of unreasonable decisions by visa officers concerning issues pursuant to S. 19 (1)(e) and S. 19 (1)(f),(k) and (l) of the Immigration Act;
2. The exception set out in 19(1)(f) establishes no procedure to determine whether a refugee is "detrimental to the national interest";
3. The phrase "detrimental to the national interest" is too vague and uncertain and needs to be defined;