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FILE NO.: 21937

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA  
(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

BETWEEN:

PATRICK FRANCIS WARD

Appellant

AND:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

AND:

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES  
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD  
CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES

Intervenors

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FACTUM OF THE INTERVENOR, CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES

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Ottawa Agent for the  
Intervenor, Canadian  
Council for Refugees

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Ottawa Agent for the  
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TO: THE REGISTRAR OF THIS COURT

10 AND TO:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
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PART I - Statement of Facts

- 10 1. The intervenor, the Canadian Council for Refugees (C.C.R.), is a national, federally incorporated non-profit and umbrella organization founded in 1978. It comprises about 90 member agencies working with and on behalf of refugees and refugee claimants across Canada. The C.C.R. in the present case has for the first time in its history sought intervenor status, and this because of the importance of the issues raised.
- 20 2. The C.C.R. adopts the statements of the appellant concerning the facts of the present case and the decisions of the Minister of Employment and Immigration, the Immigration Appeal Board and the Federal Court of Appeal.
- Appellant's Factum, paragraphs 1-16 (pp. 1-3), 18 (pp. 3-4), 19 (p. 4), 20 (p. 4), 22 (p. 6) and 44 (pp. 14-15)

PART II - Points In Issue

- 30 3. This intervention addresses the interpretation found in the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal of the meaning of a) "membership in a particular social group," one of the five grounds for a claim to Convention refugee status found in s. 2(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the "Act") and b) "is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country," found in s. 2(1) of the Act as part of the definition of Convention refugee. The present intervenor also addresses the issue as to whether this interpretation is consistent with s. 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
- 40

PART III - The LawThe Interpretation of Social Group

10 4. It is submitted that the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case relating to "membership in a particular social group" and "is unable or...is unwilling" is incorrect according to the authorities which Mr. Justice Urie has explicitly referred to as being persuasive.

20 5. The Act requires that Canadian immigration policy and rules and regulations be designed and administered in a manner so that standards of admission are consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in a manner which fulfils Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees.

S. 3(f)(g), Immigration Act, 1976-77, c. 52 as amended

30 6. Elements of the definition of Convention refugee such as "social group" and "unable or...unwilling" as found in a statute such as the Immigration Act must be interpreted consistently with Charter values. It is submitted that the interpretation of "particular social group" by the Federal Court of Appeal in this case will have an adverse impact on women and children seeking asylum in Canada, in a manner inconsistent with s. 15 of the Charter.

Hills v. Canada (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 226, 227 (S.C.C.)

40 7. It is submitted that the Court in the present case erred in its interpretation of "particular social group": a) in holding that the INLA was the appellant's social group and b) in requiring that the activities of such a group be perceived as a possible danger to the state.



The INLA as a Particular Social Group

Method of Identification

8. The Court determined the appellant's particular social group to be the INLA solely on the basis of his testimony to this effect at his hearing before a Senior Immigration Officer.

10 Decision, Casebook, pp. 22, 23, Vol. I

9. However, the Court also found that the United Nations' Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status serves as a persuasive guide for interpreting the definition of Convention refugee. Similar commentary regarding the importance of the Handbook as a tool for understanding the definition of refugee has recently been made in a subsequent Federal Court of Appeal decision.

20 Decision, Casebook, p. 26, Vol. I

Monica Mileva v. M.E.I., Federal Court of Appeal Decision A-726-90, February 25, 1991 at p. 7

10. This Handbook provides that it is not the applicant's duty to analyze his or her case so as to identify in detail the grounds for the persecution feared. The decision-maker has the obligation to determine these grounds and ascertain if the Convention refugee definition is satisfied in this regard.

30

The Handbook, paragraphs 66-67

11. The majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, by accepting the appellant's categorization of his particular social group, failed to independently assess whether or not this categorization was supported by the relevant facts before the Court. The Court thus failed to determine if the applicant's particular social group was not the INLA but rather, for example, defecting and former members of the INLA.

40

Actual Identification

12. In addition, the Court formulated a definition of particular

social group based on paragraphs 77-79 of the Handbook as well as on the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. It is submitted that the appellant's situation of being a defecting member of the INLA under sentence of death from this organization is incompatible with the INLA being his particular social group as defined in those authorities. The appellant was neither capable of being associated with or united to INLA members nor was he associated, allied or combined with these members. Furthermore, he was no longer of similar background, habits or social status as the INLA.

Decision, Casebook, p. 27, Vol. I  
The Handbook, paragraphs 77-79

20 The Requirement of Social Group Activities Being Perceived as a Possible Danger to the Government

13. The Court through applying paragraphs 77-79 of the Handbook required that the activities of a particular social group be perceived as being a possible danger to the state.

Decision, Casebook, p. 26, Vol. I

30 14. However, this requirement is not found anywhere in the Handbook: the perceived disloyalty of a group to a government is cited therein only as an example of a possible basis for a claim to Convention refugee status relating to membership in a particular social group.

The Handbook, paragraph 78

40 15. In addition, this requirement of the Federal Court of Appeal that social group activities be perceived as a possible danger to the state renders a claim to Convention refugee status based on this ground dependent upon establishing persecution based on political opinion. The latter may be that which is attributed to the claimant by that person's government. Thus being perceived as a possible danger to the state is relevant to a claim based on



political opinion. While it is contemplated in the Handbook that the grounds for a claim to Convention refugee status may overlap, it was clearly not the intention of the drafters of this document or of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that one ground should be a pre-condition for the availability of another.

10

The Handbook, paragraphs 66, 77 and 80

16. Finally, the appellant's conflict with the INLA was treated differentially within the majority judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal. The Court held that having dissociated himself from the INLA, he was no longer perceived as a possible danger to the state. However, in determining that the INLA was the appellant's relevant social group, the Court disregarded his departure from the INLA. It is submitted that this differential treatment is not supported by the Handbook.

20

Decision, Casebook, pp. 26, 27, 28, Vol. I

17. The present intervenor adopts the statements and arguments of the appellant concerning a flexible interpretation of "particular social group" in Canadian jurisprudence and in the Handbook. The concept is open-ended and includes groups not contemplated but not excluded by the drafters of the relevant refugee protection instruments. For example, women fleeing persecution based on their gender share a common background and social status for which they are persecuted and thus constitute a social group as understood in the Convention refugee definition.

30

Appellant's Factum, paragraphs 25-33 (pp. 7-11) and 39-41 (pp. 13-14)

40

Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 30

David Neal, "Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum," (1988) 20 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, No. 1, 203, at 230

18. It is submitted that this flexible interpretation is also consistent with s. 15 of the Charter. The concept of analogous group is flexible and open-ended and develops as societies evolve. Therefore, s. 15 requires that the term "particular social group" be interpreted in such a flexible manner.

10 Law Society of B.C. et al. v. Andrews et al. (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 32-33 (S.C.C.)

The Interpretation of "is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"

19. The present intervenor adopts the statements and arguments of the appellant concerning the non-requirement of state complicity in persecution where one is unwilling to avail oneself of the protection of one's country but offers the following submission concerning the meaning of "...is unable or, by reason of such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

20

Appellant's Factum, paragraphs 45-56 (pp. 15-18)

20. It is submitted that the issue of state complicity relates to the concept of "agents of persecution" and not to unwillingness or inability to avail oneself of the protection of one's country.

30

21. "Agents of persecution" relates to the claimant's situation within the country of nationality and includes the state being unable to protect against non-government acts of persecution there. Protection as referred to in this part of the Handbook implies the state's potential intervention against such acts within the country of nationality, i.e., "internal protection."

40

The Handbook, paragraph 65  
Goodwin-Gill, supra at 10-11

22. It is submitted that "...is unable or, ...is unwilling" relates to the claimant's situation outside the country of

nationality. Protection as referred to in this part of the definition of Convention refugee is external or diplomatic, involving a benefit due by the state to a national who is outside the country of citizenship. Examples of this type of protection are the state's issuance of a passport or granting admission to a national. Inability or unwillingness thus refers to the claimant's relationship with the consular or diplomatic representatives of his/her country of origin. The international doctrine and Handbook provide illustrations of this concept of protection.

Goodwin-Gill, supra at 10-11

Paul Weis, "The Concept of the refugee in international law," (1960) 87 Journal du droit international 928, at 974

Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. 1 (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966) at 253-257, 381-392

The Handbook, paragraphs 97-100

23. It is submitted that the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case improperly accepted the reference point for an analysis of the meaning of "is unable or...is unwilling..." to avail oneself of the protection of one's government to be the claimant in the country of origin, rather than of refugee. This means that the Court imported the requirement of state complicity in "unwilling" where there is in fact no relation between these two concepts.

24. Finally, it is submitted that even if its analysis of "unwilling" from the perspective of the claimant within the country of origin is correct, the majority decision erred in finding that the appellant was unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country. Unwillingness involves the availability of state protection and the claimant's refusal to accept it because of his/her well-founded fear of persecution.

The Handbook, paragraph 100

10 25. The appellant in the present case was assisted in leaving Ireland by authorities of that country, namely the prison chaplain and the police, after seeking protection from the state against the INLA. The appellant was advised that the state would be unable to offer him protection in Ireland. Thus the appellant was not "unwilling" but rather "unable" to avail himself of the protection of his country, such protection being unavailable or ineffective.

Decision, Casebook, pp. 21, 31, Vol. I

The Handbook, paragraph 98

Zalzali v. M.E.I. (1991), 126 N.R. 126, at 133-138

20

The Charter: Application

26. Section 15 of the Charter protects against distinctions leading to prejudice or disadvantage. It protects against both intentional and adverse impact discrimination.

Andrews, supra at 13, 22-24

McKinney v. University of Guelph (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 544, at 647 (S.C.C.)

30

27. A group need not be singled out for differential treatment before discrimination arises. An apparently neutral rule applying equally to everyone to whom it is intended to apply may be discriminatory because of its adverse effect on certain groups whether or not any intention to discriminate exists. Such groups cannot in accordance with s. 15 of the Charter be affected differently from others to whom the rule may apply.

40

Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 546-547, 551

28. In the human rights context, equality requires equal access to facilities, services and employment free from arbitrary



obstructions. Discrimination results from such barriers standing between the merits of an applicant (his or her ability in the case of equality in the area of employment) and that person's opportunity to demonstrate that ability. If certain groups are affected by the barrier in a disproportionately negative way, an indication exists that the cause of this adverse impact is discriminatory. For example, discrimination on the basis of gender includes practices having the effect of limiting the employment opportunities available to employees on the basis of a characteristic related to gender. A finding of discrimination does not require a) disparate treatment founded solely on one of the prohibited grounds or b) everyone in the affected group to be treated identically. The fact that some members of such a group are not adversely affected by a discriminatory policy or action is no bar to such a finding. What is required is that the prohibited ground be for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination. It is submitted that similarly, in the refugee determination context, it is irrelevant if some members of a social group can meet the requirements imposed by the Federal Court of Appeal and be found to be Convention refugees.

30 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 at 1279, 1288-1291 (S.C.C.)

29. Constructive discrimination has thus been recognized in cases where a policy requirement has the effect of excluding certain groups, e.g., Sikhs and Orthodox Jews, from access to a school because of a dress code.

40 Sehdev v. Bayview Glen Junior Schools Ltd. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R.D/4881 at paragraphs 37760, 37776, 37777 (Cumming, Ont. Bd. Inq.)

30. It is submitted that the requirements imposed by the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case that a) social group activities be seen as a possible danger



to the state and b) state complicity be necessary where one is unwilling to avail oneself of the protection of one's country are similarly discriminatory. These new requirements will have an adverse impact on historically disadvantaged groups such as women and children, by making it more difficult for them to obtain asylum/international protection in Canada when they face persecution.

31. These new requirements imposed by the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case are thus inconsistent with Charter values as expressed in s. 15 because they adversely affect the ability of certain groups to satisfy the Convention refugee definition, as incorporated into Canadian law, on the basis of characteristics relating to gender and age. The nature of the persecution historically perpetrated against women and children is less likely to meet these new requirements than the types of persecution most often directed against men. According to the Canadian human rights jurisprudence referred to above, it is irrelevant if some women and children could meet these requirements and be found to be Convention refugees.

30 The Historical and Political Context

32. An examination of the historical and political context is necessary in order to provide a factual foundation to establish that this interpretation of the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case is inconsistent with s. 15 of the Charter.

Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1990), 112 N.R. 362, at 375 (S.C.C.)

40

33. The refugee conventions have been generally interpreted in such a way as to protect persons from persecution which arises from public activities. The persecution directed at women, however, has often been persecution within the private domain. The distinction between private and public is artificial: often,

what is perceived as the private domain in the context of women is in fact sanctioned or at least not prevented by the state.

Anders Johnsson, "The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal Problems and Issues," (1989) 1 I.J.R.L. No. 2 221, at 222-223

- 10 Charlotte Bunch, "Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Revision of Human Rights" (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly, No. 4 486, at 491-492

#### The Treatment of Women

- 20 34. Women and children are often persecuted for reasons different from those of men. They have historically been vulnerable and persecuted in a context in which they have not been perceived as a possible danger to the state. For example, women are often assaulted by authorities in order to harm their spouse and not because of their own activities. They are in many cases persecuted so that the authorities may extract information about their husband's whereabouts or political activities.

Anders Johnsson, *supra* at 222-223

Charlotte Bunch, *supra* at 491-492

- 30 35. Another example is the situation of women caught in the crossfire of civil war or unrest: they are vulnerable to brutal treatment at the hands of government and opposition forces. Often in these situations they are raped and forced into slavery and prostitution.

"Women in the Front Line," Amnesty International Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 2, February/March 1991 at 2-7

"Sullied bride seen as a sacrifice," Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 3, 1990

- 40 "Women in Afghanistan raped and killed by Mujahideen," (1989) WIN News Vol. 15, No. 3, at 57

"Violation of women by armed forces in Ethiopia," (1990) WIN News Vol. 16, No. 4, at 48

36. In India, despite the illegality of the practices, dowry deaths or bride burning continue, with the potential husband viewing dowry and marriage as a "get-rich-quick scheme". If the promised money or goods do not materialize, the woman is often set on fire, and her death may be reported as accidental.

10 Charlotte Bunch, *supra* at 489-490

Lori Heise, "Crimes of Gender," World Watch, March-April, 1989 12 at 14-16

37. Women also bear the brunt of caste prejudices in India. Lower caste females are routinely sexually assaulted by caste Hindus and teenagers have their tongues cut off by their attackers to prevent them from reporting the matter to the police. The caste system leads to social stratification and is a method of dividing limited resources in a discriminatory manner. It is characterized by interdependence between upper and lower castes in the means of production. Thus the latter groups are not perceived as a possible danger to the state but rather as essential to its functioning.

20

30 Roshani Gunewardene, "The Caste System: A Violation of Fundamental Human Rights?" (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal No. 1-2 35, at 37-39, 53

#### The Treatment of Children

38. A similar example is found in India where girls as young as nine years old are sold to brothels by slave traders. They then exist for only one purpose, that being the performance of the sexual act. The vast majority of those rescued suffer from venereal disease, tuberculosis, hepatitis and the effects of chronic malnutrition. Only a small fraction of these girls are rescued, due in part to the few resources available.

40

"Girls sold into India sex slave trade," *The Sunday Star*, July 7, 1991, at A1

39. In Iraq children of both genders have become the victims of

human rights violations in the form of arbitrary arrest, detention and execution. Some are imprisoned as hostages in place of relatives sought by the authorities and are tortured by them. Even infants are mistreated to compel members of their families to confess to alleged political offences. An example occurred in March 1986 when Kurdish forces were alleged to have made an attempt to assassinate the Governor of Arbil. In an act of retribution 15 students from secondary schools and university were arrested and executed in public.

Amnesty International Bulletin, May 1989, Vol. XVI, No. 3

40. Violations have also occurred in Guatemala against children, arising from their families' activities. For example, armed soldiers beat the thirteen-year-old daughter of the president of a group organizing rural peasants. There exists forced recruitment and use of children under 16 years of age by the armed forces and civil patrol system in Guatemala. Boys are compelled to perform forced labour. They are forced to engage in combat against guerillas. Children have also been obliged to perform army surveillance tasks and are punished if they refuse to inform the military of the activities of family members. In addition, there is a campaign of official violence directed against street children including extrajudicial beatings and executions, a practice found also in Brazil.

"Children without Childhood: Violations of Children's Rights in Guatemala," (1990) Children's Rights International at 3-9 and 18-20

"Death squads target children," *The Globe & Mail*, December 7, 1991 at A13

40

41. In Sudan Dinka women and children are enslaved through kidnapping and forced labour amounting to slavery. This is done by the Baggara of Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur. The phenomenon of pawning results in the mistreatment of the pawn children, including rape and forced concubinage, beating,



excessive workload and inadequate food. Pawn children are transferred to second and third "patrons" for money in transactions tantamount to sale. In addition, women and children often work for only food and shelter and are abused and subject to complete domination by the employer.

10 "Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster," Africa Watch, March, 1990 at 139-151

42. Over 100,000 orphans in Sudan have escaped to refugee camps since 1987 in order to avoid slavery. Thousands of other children aged 8 to 14 have been recruited to fight in the civil war there. The latter are another clear example of a group which is not seen as a possible danger to the state and thus does not constitute a "particular social group" according to the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case. An 20 eight year old boy in such circumstances is not so perceived; he is on the contrary considered to be an instrument of state policy, being compelled to fight in a civil war on the side of the government.

African Letter, October 16-31, 1991 at 21

30 African Letter, September 1-15, 1991 at 2

43. The preceding examples of the treatment of women and children all point to situations where members of these groups would not be perceived as a possible danger to the government and where the state may not be complicitous in the acts of persecution against them. The requirements for Convention refugee status which are outlined in the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case have an adverse or 40 disproportionately negative impact upon these historically vulnerable groups. This impact is discriminatory and thus the interpretation of the Federal Court of Appeal is inconsistent with s. 15 of the Charter.

44. It is further submitted that those tribunals charged with



making determinations concerning refugee status in Canada including the Immigration and Refugee Board and the Immigration Appeal Board have, in the past, found persons from a variety of circumstances and social groups to be Convention refugees, even though they posed no threat to their states of origin. Should the added requirements of the majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal be upheld, similar claims would be barred in the future, excluding some of the weakest and most vulnerable groups, presently found to be entitled to refugee protection in Canada.

10 IRB No. M89-00562 (May, 1989)

Incirciyan v. M.E.I., IAB No. M87-1541X, M87-1248  
(August 10, 1987)

20 C.R.D.D. No. T89-00260 (July 27, 1989)

45. It is therefore submitted that the affected groups described herein are not theoretical or potential refugee claimants, but representative of small numbers of the actual refugee population currently reaching Canada. The Canadian refugee determination system must continue to have sufficient flexibility in its interpretation of the Convention refugee definition in order to avoid discrimination against women, children and the innocent victims of war.

46. However, it is to be noted that these examples are comprised for the most part of persons who are not physically or economically able to arrive in Canada and thus, most would be unable to assert a claim to refugee status. Moreover, it is submitted that a preferable construction of the statutory definition of refugee is not to be discarded because its adoption might lead to an increase of claims.

40 Zalzali v. M.E.I. (1991), 126 N.R. 126 at 136

Part IV - Nature of the Order Sought

10 47. The Intervenor respectfully requests that this Appeal be allowed, so that the interpretation of "membership in a particular social group" and "...is unable or,...is unwilling" as found in s. 2(1) of the Immigration Act as elements of the definition of Convention refugee may be consistent with international law and s. 15 of the Charter.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

20 Date: *January 10, 1992*

*Phyllis Gordon*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Phyllis Gordon

Counsel for the Intervenor, Canadian  
Council for Refugees

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APPENDIX "A": LIST OF CASES

- 10 1. Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1990), 112 N.R. 362  
2. Hills v. Canada (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 193  
3. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252  
4. Law Society of B.C. et al. v. Andrews et al. (1989),  
56 D.L.R. (4th) 1  
5. McKinney v. University of Guelph (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 544  
20 6. Monica Mileva v. M.E.I., Federal Court of Appeal  
Decision A-726-90, February 25, 1991 at p. 7  
7. Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpson-  
Sears Ltd. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536  
8. R. v. Lavallée (1990), 108 N.R. 321  
9. Sehdev v. Bayview Glen Junior School Ltd. (1988), 9  
C.H.R.R.D./4881  
30 10. Zalzali v. M.E.I. (1991), 126 N.R. 126

APPENDIX "B": LIST OF ARTICLES AND AUTHORITIES

- 10 1. African Letter, October 16-31, 1991
2. African Letter, September 1-15, 1991
3. Africa Watch, March 1990, "Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster"
4. Amnesty International Bulletin, May 1989, Vol. XVI, No. 3
5. Amnesty International Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 2, February/  
March 1991, "Women in the Front Line"
- 20 6. Bunch, Charlotte, "Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a  
Revision of Human Rights" (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly,  
No. 4, 486
7. Children's Rights International 1990: Children without  
childhood: Violations of children's rights in Guatemala
8. The Globe and Mail, December 7, 1991, p. A13, "Death squads  
target children"
9. Goodwin-Gill, Guy - The Refugee in International Law  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)
- 30 10. Grahl-Madsen, Atle - The Status of Refugees in International  
Law, Vol. 1 (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966)
11. Gunewardene, Roshani - "The Caste System: A Violation of  
Fundamental Human Rights" (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal  
No. 1
12. Heise, Lori - "Crimes of Gender," World Watch, March/April  
(1989) 12
- 40 13. Johnson, Anders - "The International Protection of Women  
Refugees: Summary of Principal Problems and Issues" (1989)  
1 I.J.R.L. No. 2, 221
14. Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 3, 1990 - "Sullied Bride  
Seen as a Sacrifice"
15. Neal, David - "Women as a social group: Recognizing sex-  
based persecution as grounds for asylum" (1988) 20 Columbia  
Human Rights Law Review, No. 1, 203

16. The Sunday Star, July 7, 1991, p. A1, "Girls sold into India sex slave trade"
17. United Nations Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
18. Weis, Paul - "The Concept of the Refugee in International Law" (1960) 87 Journal du droit International 928
19. WIN News (1989) Vol. 15, No. 3: Women in Afghanistan raped and killed by Mujahideen
20. WIN News (1990) Vol. 16, No. 4: "Violations of women by armed forces in Ethiopia"

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Service hereof admitted this

14 day of Jan 1999

Gold Gullies

Ottawa Agents for

Patrick Francis Wood

*PF Wood*

Service hereof admitted this

14 day of Jan 1992

144 Beechwood, North York, Ontario

Ottawa Agents for

The Immigration & Refugee Board

& the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees

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Admitted this 14th day  
Acceptée le 14th jour  
of January 1992  
de Linda Gauthier 2:05 pm.

for  
pour John C. Tait, Q.C.  
Deputy Attorney General of Canada  
Sous-procureur général du Canada